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Plans for a Nordic nuclear-weapon free zone
Introduction
Unto Vesa made seven published contributions in four languages to the debate
on a Nordic Nuclear-weapon Free Zone (NNFZ) from the period 1975 to
1982. These were the core years of this proposal which now resembles a fly
preserved in the aspic of the Cold War and which never quite managed to get
off the ground. Nevertheless, it is worth looking back at these proposals, not
least because they reflected some of the Cold War fears and hopes in the
Nordic region, but also because they were the concern of Finnish researchers
at that time, such as Unto Vesa, who made a contribution to the debate on
Finnish foreign policy and Nordic security policy more widely. Indeed, he was
a member of the Advisory Board on UN Affairs of the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs, as well as a member of the Finnish delegation to the 29th, 30th, 32nd
and 34th sessions of the General Assembly of the UN. This chapter will re-
visit the NNFZ proposals and will evaluate their wider significance.
Background to the proposals
The security background to the proposals is fairly well known to those engaged
in the study of the Nordic region. After the Second World War, the Nordic
states were originally neutral in the emerging rift between the Soviet Union
and the leading Western states but by 1948 Sweden, Denmark and Norway
felt it best to discuss how they might organize their defences together. After
the failure of the talks about a Nordic Defence Union, Norway and Denmark,
joined by Iceland, signed the North Atlantic Treaty, Sweden remained outside
alliances while Finland had already agreed the Treaty of Friendship
Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union early in 1948.
The three Nordic NATO members became more involved in the military side
of the alliance throughout the 1950s, though Norway and Denmark did preclude
foreign bases on their metropolitan territory (there were US bases in
Greenland  and  in  Iceland).  In  1957  both  the  Danish  and  Norwegian
governments expressed their wish not to have any nuclear weapons on their
territory, hoping that this restraint would, in the words of H.C. Hansen, the
Danish prime minister, make ?a contribution to bring about a favourable
atmosphere? that would ?attain political détente between East and West?1.
Both the Danish and Norwegian governments resisted Soviet attempts in
1957?1958 to institutionalise the nuclear-free status of the Nordic region.
However, this self-denying ordnance had certain limits. It was a unilateral
declaration by each government which could be withdrawn and both
government limited its validity to peace-time. As Sverre Lodgaard and Nils
Petter Gleditsch wrote: nuclear weapons could be used from Norwegian (and
1 SNU 1982, 73.
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Danish) territory in wartime or when war was threatened and they could ?be
directed from Norwegian territory even in peacetime, e.g. in preparation for a
first strike?2.
Despite this, and with the absence of any nuclear weapons in Finland and
Sweden, the Nordic region appeared, by the start of the 1960s, to be de facto,
free of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the reliance on nuclear weapons by
both alliances in Europe, NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization, seemed
to be growing and public concern about the stockpiling of nuclear weapons
was on the increase with the rise of organizations such a the Campaign for
Nuclear Disarmament in the UK and the Orientering group in Norway. In the
late 1950s, the Swedish government had discussed whether it should have
nuclear weapons but had dismissed the idea. This led the way for the Swedish
foreign minister, Östen Undén, to propose the creation of a club of nuclear
weapon-free states that had rejected the production or placement on their
territory of nuclear weapons. While the idea got some support from the other
Nordic states, it did not get very far. However, it formed the background to a
geographically more limited proposal advanced by President Kekkonen of
Finland in 1963.
The Kekkonen proposals
In the aftermath of the Cuban Missile crisis, President Kekkonen took up the
Undén plan and asked that the Nordic states should confirm their position on
forming a nuclear-free area:
?the Scandinavian states already in fact form a nuclear-free zone. This, however,
depends at present merely on unilateral declarations on their part. The act of
confirming the present state of affairs through mutual undertakings in the
manner  envisaged in  the Undén plan would not  require  a  change in  the
policies adopted by the Scandinavian states nor impair their security.3
Kekkonen?s reasoning was that such a zone would remove the Nordic region
?unequivocally from the sphere of speculation caused by the development of
nuclear strategy and [would] ensure that this area will remain outside
international tension?4. However, part of the Undén plan was that the nuclear
powers should ban nuclear weapons tests, and only limited progress had been
made in that area by 1963. The Swedes wished to stress this pre-condition,
while the Danish and Norwegian governments wanted to keep the wartime
opt-out from any nuclear-free status. They felt that the proposal would have a
negative effect on their security to the benefit of the USSR5.
The Kekkonen proposal was revived in 1972 after a number of international
agreements had been signed in a period of détente. These included the Limited
Test Ban treaty of 1963, the prohibitions on placing nuclear weapons on the
seabed (1971) and outer space (1968), the treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons
in Latin America (1967) and the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty. With
Swedish  ratification  of  the  last  treaty  in  1969,  all  the  Nordic  states  had
declared abstinence from having nuclear weapons in peacetime. From 1972 to
1975, Finnish diplomats, at the behest of President Kekkonen advanced
2 Lodgaard &
Gleditsch 1977, 218.
3 Kekkonen, as
quoted in Vilkuna
1970, 143.
4 Ibid.
5 Vesa 1979, 13?15.
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proposals for a NNFZ. This proposal stressed the need to ban the stationing of
foreign nuclear weapons in the region and provided a link between a Nordic
zone, wider European security and a guarantee that the two superpowers, the
US and the Soviet Union, would respect such a zone.
Again the response in the Nordic region was guarded. The Swedish foreign
ministry adviser, Anders Thunborg6, pointed to the problematic nature of the
presence of Soviet and Western nuclear forces in the seas around the area, in
the Kola Peninsula and in Germany, while expressing a willingness to partici-
pate in negotiations. Norway, in the middle of sensitive negotiations about
the delineation of the Barents Sea with the USSR, was reluctant to give
?unilateral Norwegian concessions in the area of security?7. As the signing of
the  Final  Act  of  the  Conference  on  Security  and Cooperation  in  Europe
(CSCE) in Helsinki drew closer, Finnish diplomats turned their attention to
that meeting. Nevertheless, in 1975 the UN General Assembly adopted the
proposals of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament that set out
seven ?principles that should be respected in the establishment of zones?8.
There was less agreement on other issues, such as the responsibilities of the
nuclear powers.
The third set of Kekkonen proposals came in 1978 at a time when the nuclear
temperature was rising in Europe with discussions about the introduction of
the so-called Neutron Bomb into Western Europe and the lead-up to NATO?s
December 1979 decision to follow the ?Dual Track? of modernisation of inter-
mediate nuclear forces and arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union.
In his speech of 8th May 1978 President Kekkonen mentioned especially
developments in military technology such as ?cruise? missiles that would ?make
the use of third-country and neutral air space a routine matter?. He wanted
their development frozen and, meanwhile, the Nordic states should start
negotiations among themselves and with the great powers about arms control.
The aim:
would be a separate treaty arrangement covering the Nordic countries which
would isolate  them as  completely  as  possible  from the effects  of  nuclear
strategy in general and new nuclear weapons technology in particular.9
He also recognised that any such arrangement for the Nordic states would
?affect the interests of the leading nuclear weapon states? and that these
powers would have to participate in talks from an early stage10. The Soviet
Union continued to be broadly sympathetic towards Kekkonen?s proposals
but the other Nordic states refused to change their position. In particular
Sweden was adamant that the Baltic Sea would also have to be included in
any negotiations and Norway and Denmark considered that tactical weapons
in Soviet areas bordering the Nordic region should be included. The Soviet
Union was not prepared to accept such a widening of the zone11.
The proposals for a NNFZ from President Kekkonen spread over some fifteen
years. They started as a fairly general proposal and ended with a suggestion of
a treaty that would also be negotiated with the nuclear powers. They spanned
6 Thunborg 1975, 37.
7 Holst 1975, 33.
8 Vesa 1982, 7.
9 Kekkonen 1978, 7.
10 Ibid., 10.
11 Vesa 1982, 12.
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a period of deep Cold War, détente and the beginnings of the New Cold War.
They generally found support in the Soviet Union, but were rejected by Norway
and Denmark, with Sweden expressing strong reservations. On the whole,
the other NATO states did not comment. The genesis of the proposals has been
discussed and reference made to a mixture of international events and domestic
considerations12. From the Finnish perspective, the proposals meant that they
were not just onlookers but, in Unto Vesa?s words, ?small states are not only
objects but also subjects?13. It might be thought that the proposals were part
of a Finnish need to ingratiate their country with the Soviet Union, without
much cost. Another perspective was placed on this view by a Finnish diplomat,
closely involved in the Kekkonen proposals, who claimed that the proposals
had another result: they reminded the Soviet Union that the Nordic region
was basically nuclear-free and it allowed the other Nordic states to re-iterate
this status not just to the Soviets but, in the case of Denmark and Norway, to
their NATO colleagues.
Later proposals
More proposals were advanced for a NNFZ early in the 1980s, but this time
by the Norwegians and Swedes. The background to these ideas was the descent
into a New Cold War that affected Europe, not least the Nordic region: the
Dual Track decision by NATO, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the
publicising of Presidential Directive 59 in the United States that some interpreted
as US plans for war-fighting and winning in Europe14. There was a feeling in
Norway that the facilities used by Norway to support its command, control
and communications could be used to help conduct a nuclear war15. The former
Labour minister Jens Evensen picked up on some of these concerns when he
made a renewed cal for a NNFZ in October 1980, a move that seemed to be
supported by the Norwegian prime minister, Oddvar Nordli, in his New Year?s
speech of January 1981. Ambassador Evensen?s plan was for a zone based on a
treaty and four main elements: the NNFZ states would undertake to remain
free of nuclear weapons in wartime as in peacetime; the nuclear powers would
guarantee not to use or threaten the use of such weapons against the states in
the zone; a control apparatus would oversee the observation of the treaty; and
the creation of the zone would help to lower tension and thus preserve peace16.
The zone states (and others) would not be able to test, produce or acquire
nuclear weapons in the area. The receipt or storage by these countries, or on
behalf of others, of nuclear weapons, participation in the production of such
weapons and the transport or transit of these weapons and equipment would
also be forbidden. The territory covered would include the territorial sea and
airspace and any vessels or craft under the flags of the zone states17. The treaty
would have forbidden states from sending cruise missiles through Nordic
airspace18. The negative guarantees by nuclear states would have to be
negotiated between them and the Nordic states and could be supplemented
by a ?thinning out? of deployment in the areas and seas near the Nordic region19.
The Evensen proposal was followed up by other proposals from within the
Nordic area. The most important of these were the ideas put forward by the
12 Archer 1984, 26.
13 Vesa 1982, 10.
14 Evensen 1983,
414?435.
15 SNU 1982, 126.
16 Evensen 1983, 39.
17 Evensen 1982,
417?420.
18 Evensen 1983,
42?44.
19 Ibid., 51?52.
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Norwegian Labour Party from April 1981 to June 1982, by President Koivisto
of Finland in 1982 and Olof Palme, the then Swedish prime minister, in 1983.
These tended to stress the existing nuclear-free nature of the Nordic region,
wanted reciprocal arrangements for the areas around the Nordic region, made
more reference to the wider security context of the Nordic countries and,
unlike the Evensen plan, did not advance specific treaties20.
A number of events seemed to dull the prospects for a NNFZ agreement. The
US came out with a negative response once the Reagan administration had
taken office. The result of the September 1981 election in Norway saw the
dismissal of the Labour government and a Conservative government coming
to  power  that  was  sceptical  about  the  NNFZ.  Finally,  the  October  1981
?Whisky  on  the  rocks? incident  in  Karlskrona,  Sweden,  when  a  Soviet
submarine, almost certainly with nuclear weapons on board, surfaced and ran
aground in Swedish territorial waters. As Unto Vesa wrote:
This precluded at least in the short run, the possibility of fruitful negotiations
on the zone. Furthermore, the incident pointed out in practice the difficulties
related to the verification of a potential zone, especially if the Baltic were to
be included in some way ? i.a. because no one had previously thought that
this type of out-dated submarine might be carrying nuclear explosives.21
By 1985, proposals for a NNFZ had been well and truly integrated into the
Nordic security discourse. A report of Norwegian officials in 1985 from the
?Zone Committee?22 chaired by Ambassador Kjell Colding, placed the NNFZ
proposals in the context of wider alliance considerations and the coming to
power in the Soviet Union of Mikael Gorbachev opened up a much broader
panoply of arms control and disarmament proposals. In 1987 the Nordic foreign
ministers established a group of officials to report on the proposals which they
did at a leisurely pace. There report managed to come out some months before
the collapse of the Soviet Union and effectively buried the NNFZ idea,
relegating it to a previous age23.
An evaluation
Were the NNFZ proposals of any use? An agreement was not reached on such
a zone. Were they a distraction from more worthwhile negotiations such as
the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) and the wider
CSCE forum24? Or was it something that was ?possible and [?] in the best
interests of all the Nordic peoples?25?
The proposals can be evaluated not so much as concrete ideas to reduce the
threat from nuclear weapons, but as political manoeuvres. The Kekkonen
proposals, as has been suggested above, can be seen both as a way to cement
relations with the Soviet Union at the same time as reminding the Soviets of
the actual nuclear-free status of the Nordic region. By obliging the Danish
and Norwegian governments to re-iterate their statements about nuclear
weapons, this entrenched that status and led both these governments to attempt
to tighten up on questions such as the visit to their ports of allied vessels with
nuclear weapons on board.
20 Archer 1984, 32?47,
63.
21 Vesa 1982, 15?16.
22 Det Kgl. Utenriks-
departementet 1985
23 Utrikes-
departementet 1991,
70.
24 Archer 1984, 61.
25 Vesa 1982, 18.
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Secondly, the proposals, especially those in the 1980s, led to security issues
being discussed within and between the Nordic countries. On the whole
defence debates within the Nordic states had been muted and it had not been
the case that defence and security issues were discussed between the states,
with the exception of cooperation on UN peacekeeping. The NNFZ idea
changed that and started a lively debate, especially within Norway and
Denmark in the first half of the 1980s. It also led to the Nordic foreign ministers
issuing joint statements on the subject and establishing an official committee
to study the subject.
These moves, together with others such as the Finnish involvement in CSCE,
the Swedish engagement with the CDE talks and Danish and Norwegian
activity in NATO at the end of the 1980s, meant that the Nordic states were
becoming more the subjects of international security rather than just the objects.
This trend can increasingly be seen in the 1990s, when some of the alternative
strands of thinking about security surfaced in the post-Cold War era26.
Finally, the ideas reflected the public concern within the Nordic states ? and
Europe more widely ? about the nuclearization of security in the region. Some
of these concerns were expressed in movements and political parties, others
were voiced more privately. By bringing to the fore proposals for declaring a
region in Europe nuclear free, President Kekkonen and, later, the Norwegian
government, connected to those concerns and did not demean what were real
fears. At a time when many were blasé about nuclear weapons, the proposals
reminded people of their potential and their problematic nature. The plans
thus allowed a public discourse ? and not one that was necessarily won by the
proponents of the zone ? in the Nordic states that was often stifled in other
Western countries such as France and the United Kingdom.
Finally, did the zone proposals contribute to the de-nuclearization of the Nordic
region? They may have done to a small extent by making the NATO Nordic states
more fastidious about keeping to their self-proclaimed nuclear-free status, but
on the whole the de-nuclearization of Europe more generally was achieved by
negotiations between the European states, for example within CSCE, and between
the two blocs. In some way the NNFZ proposals can be seen as a distraction from
the main effort towards mutual disarmament in the 1980s.
Relevance today?
The NNFZ proposals can be seen as a part of history of little relevance to
Norden today. But perhaps there are some wider lessons to be learnt.
The first is that, while it is easier for small states to swim with the international
tide, sometimes it is necessary to go against the conventional wisdom. There
were plenty of voices in that poured scorn on Kekkonen?s ideas and even more
that expressed scepticism towards the Evensen plan and Norwegian follow-ups.
However, these ideas did provide an impetus to the security debate in the
north of Europe that otherwise may well have been lacking.
26 Archer 2005.
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 Secondly the proposals showed that the Nordic states did have something to
say collectively about security. Of course, that they were initiated by Finland
? traditionally the stumbling block for any security discussions between the
Nordic states ? allowed a debate to commence. The magic word was whispered
and from then onwards the Nordic states were able to discuss security issues
over and above questions concerning UN peacekeeping.
Third, the issue brought questions of security to a wider public and they have
stayed there ever since. Security questions have anyhow changed in nature
and now touch on a wider range of questions ranging from the environment to
disease. What Unto Vesa spotted was that the NNFZ proposals were not just
the concern of politicians but that it was ?first and foremost the responsibility
and right of the people to struggle for this goal [of the elimination of nuclear
weapons]? 27. At a time when security concerns were too often seen as elite
concerns he reminded us that, in the end, how a state organizes its security
and with what means should be the concern of the citizen. That message
resonates through the decades.
27 Vesa 1982, 20.
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